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Notes
Chicago Bar Association v. Illinois State Board of
Elections: The End of the Line for the Popular
Initiative in Illinois?
I. INTRODUCTION

In the November 1994 general election, Illinois called upon its
voters to adopt or reject two proposed amendments to the 1970 Illinois
Constitution.' Illinois voters, however, never got the opportunity to
vote on a third proposed amendment, a term-limit amendment. Although a proposed term-limit amendment appeared on the ballots of
eight other jurisdictions,2 the term-limit amendment was conspicuously
absent from the Illinois ballot--despite the efforts of two organizations
that collectively obtained over 437,000 signatures in favor of proposing a term-limit amendment to the Illinois Constitution.3 Many
voters probably failed to notice the absence of a proposed term-limit
amendment, an absence directly attributable to an Illinois Supreme
Court decision. 4
On August 10, 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Chicago Bar
Association v. Illinois State Board of Elections,5 entered a judgment
1. GEORGE H. RYAN, SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF ILLINOIS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO THE CONSTITUTION OF ILLINOIS 1 (1994). The first proposed amendment, referred to as

the Child Witness Amendment, changed the language of article I, § 8 of the Illinois
Constitution, to permit the child victims of sexual abuse to testify via closed-circuit
television. Id. at 2. See generally Thomas Conklin, Note, People v. Fitzpatrick: The
Path to Amending the Illinois Constitution to Protect Child Witnesses in Criminal
Sexual Abuse Cases, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321 (1995) (discussing Illinois voters'
response to the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d
685 (Ill. 1994)). The second amendment proposed a change in article IV, § 10 of the
Illinois Constitution, moving up the effective date of laws passed by the General
Assembly. Id. at 6. Illinois voters adopted both amendments.
2. Voters in Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, and
the District of Columbia approved ballot initiatives imposing term limits upon officeholders. Hugh Dellios, Angry Voters Have Their Say on Crime, Taxes, and More, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 10, 1994, § 1, at 10. A total of 21 states have imposed term limits upon
either their federal or state legislators, or both. Id. In the 1994 election, only Utah
failed to pass its term-limit measure. Id.
3. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 641 N.E.2d 525, 527 (I11.
1994) (per curiam) (4-3 decision).
4. See id.
5. 641 N.E.2d 525, 526 (I11.1994) (per curiam) (4-3 decision) [hereinafter CBA !I].
The court entered its judgment on August 10, 1994, and filed the written opinion on
September 7, 1994. Id. This Note will refer to this case as CBA 11 in parts III-V to
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preventing election officials from placing the proposed constitutional
amendment regarding term limits for state legislators on the November
1994 general election ballot.6 In proposing the amendment to the
legislative article of the Illinois Constitution, 7 the supporting organizations employed the popular initiative procedure set forth in article
XIV, section 3 of the constitution.8 In a four-to-three decision, the
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the proposed amendment, imposing eight-year term limits on members of the Illinois General
Assembly, failed to meet the requirement in article XIV, section 3,
which limits amendments to "structural and procedural subjects" 9 contained in the legislative article.'0
As a result of this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court has essentially left the realization of a term-limit amendment to the discretion of
the Illinois General Assembly." Because the General Assembly, more
than any other branch of government, possesses a vested interest in
Illinois' legislative branch, it is unlikely to propose an amendment
which affects the length of time that an individual may serve in the
General Assembly. 2 As such, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision
in Chicago Bar Association has effectively foreclosed the term-limit
movement in Illinois.
distinguish it from an earlier case with the same name which this Note refers to as CBA I
in parts II-V.
6. Id. at 529.
7. ILL. CONST. art. IV.
8. Id. art. XIV, § 3. For the text of the initiative provision, see infra note 44.
9. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. Structural subjects involve the composition or
organization of the General Assembly, while procedural subjects involve the methods
by which the General Assembly conducts its business. See Gordon V. Levine, The
ConstitutionalInitiative and the Structure and Procedures of the General Assembly, 11 J.
MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 387, 403 (1978).
For example, the size of the General
Assembly and the administrative organization of its committees involve structural
subjects in the legislative article. Procedural subjects include legislators' eligibility to
vote on prospective legislation. See Stephanie R. Williams, Note, Voter Initiatives in
Illinois: Where Are We After Chicago Bar Association v. State Board of Elections?, 22
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1119, 1126 n.53 (1991).
10. CBA 11, 641 N.E.2d at 529.
11. See id. In addition to the article XIV, § 3 provision providing for a limited
constitutional revision by initiative, the Illinois Constitution also allows for general
constitutional revision by convention, ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § I, and by proposals from
the General Assembly, id. art. XIV, § 2.
12. 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1399
(1970) (proposal of the Committee on Suffrage and Constitutional Amending)
[hereinafter 6 PROCEEDINGS]. In proposing the initiative provision to the constitutional
convention, the Committee on Suffrage and Constitutional Amending explained that
"voters can better decide on the merits of proposals suggesting changes in the
Legislative Article since they are not directly and personally involved .... . Id. at
1400; see infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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This Note first reviews the history of the amendment process in
Illinois, specifically focusing on the origins of the initiative provision
contained in article XIV, section 3 of the Illinois Constitution., 3 This
Note then examines Illinois cases which have interpreted the scope and
meaning of the "structural and procedural" language within the initiative provision. 4 Next, this Note discusses the facts and opinions of
Chicago BarAssociation v. Illinois State Board of Elections." Then,
this Note critically analyzes the court's interpretation of the "structural
and procedural" requirement in light of both its earlier decisions and
the intent of the framers of the popular initiative provision.16 Finally,
this Note addresses the impact of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision
in Chicago Bar Association,17 and concludes that it will significantly
limit the utility of the popular initiative provision as a method of
amending the Illinois Constitution.' 8
II. BACKGROUND
A. ConstitutionalRevision in Illinois: The Origin of the
Article XIV, Section 3 PopularInitiative Provision
The Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention in 1970 presented its
delegates' 9 with the rare opportunity to address flaws in the amending
process under the Illinois Constitution.2" Historical difficulties in
amending the Illinois Constitution precipitated the calling of the 1970
convention, and the issue of constitutional revision became one of the
first issues the delegates addressed.2' Presumably, the delegates recognized the importance of resolving the revision issue early on because of the impact the amending procedures would have upon the

13. See infra part II.A.
14. See infra part II.B.
15. See infra part III.
16. See infra part IV.
17. See infra part V.
18. See infra part VI.
19. Those who attended the convention are formally referred to as "members."
Nevertheless, they are informally referred to as "delegates" and will be referred to as such
in this Note. See Levine, supra note 9, at 387 n. 1.
20. See id. at 387. Levine characterized the task facing the delegates at the
convention as "a unique opportunity to address inadequacies in the organic law of the
State of Illinois." id.
21. DAVID KENNEY, MAKING A MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE 29
(1991). Kenney, one of the delegates at the convention in 1970, stated that "in one
sense the question of constitutional change was the foremost issue before the
convention." Id.
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document emerging from the convention.22
From its inception, the Illinois Constitution limited the procedures
for amending the document. Illinois' first constitution, the 1818
Constitution,23 provided for revision solely through a constitutional
convention, and allowed the General Assembly to decide whether to
present the voters with the convention call question.24 Even when the
General Assembly recognized the need for constitutional revision, the
voters often refused the invitation to hold a convention in the ensuing
general election. 2'
Although cumbersome, the convention method of revision remained
in the 1848 Constitution.26 In 1848, however, the delegates eased the
restrictions on amending the constitution by adding the "legislative
method" of revision.27 The legislative method allowed either house of
the General Assembly to propose amendments; nevertheless, the
amending process remained cumbersome. 28 For instance, the 1848
Constitution required each house to approve a proposed amendment
twice before its enactment.29 If the General Assembly approved the
22. Id. Specifically, Kenney states:
The nature of the amending process was certain to have a profound impact
upon all other aspects of a new constitution. If changes were to be made only
with great difficulty it would be wise to write one sort of a constitution; if
change were more accessible quite another sort would be indicated. Thus it was
desirable that the convention decide upon the amending process before it went
on to other subjects.
Id.
23. ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, § 2.
24. ALAN S. GRATCH & VIRGINIA H. UBIK, BALLOTS FOR CHANGE: NEW SUFFRAGE AND
AMENDING ARTICLES FOR ILLINOIS 12 (1973). Calling a constitutional convention was a

difficult process, in part because it required the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the
members of the General Assembly before the question of calling a convention could go
before the citizens of Illinois. Id.
25. Id. Calls for conventions failed unless "a majority of all the citizens of the state,
voting for representatives" approved the convention call. Id. The voters rejected
attempts to call conventions in 1824 and 1842, finally approving a convention in
1847. Id.; see also ELMER GERTZ & JOSEPH P. PISCIOTTE, CHARTER FOR A NEW AGE: AN
INSIDE VIEW OF THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 184-93 (1980)
(recounting the history of constitutional change in Illinois).
26. GERTZ & PISCIOT=E, supra note 25, at 185; GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 24, at 12.
27. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 24, at 12.
28. Id. at 12-13.
29. The 1848 Constitution required the occurrence of an intervening general election
between each vote of approval by the General Assembly. GEORGE D. BRADEN & RUBIN
G. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 565
(1969). For the first vote, the proposed amendment required the votes of two-thirds of
the members of both houses of the General Assembly. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 24, at
12-13. The second vote in the General Assembly required the votes of a majority of the
members in each house. Id. at 13.
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proposed amendment, the amendment appeared on the ballot at the
next general election and required approval by a majority of the
voters. 30 Thus, despite the addition of the legislative method, the process of revising the Illinois Constitution remained difficult.
This difficulty continued under the 1870 Constitution because the
1870 delegates did not substantially change the legislative method. 3 ,
The 1870 Constitution, in addition to requiring two votes in the
General Assembly, required the approval of the proposed amendment
by a majority of the general election voters, regardless of whether or
not they actually voted on the proposed amendment. 32 Thus, those
citizens who voted in the general election, but failed to vote on the
proposed amendment, were effectively casting a "no" vote for the
amendment.33
Finally, in 1950, the passage of the Gateway Amendment 34 opened
"the door to piece-meal constitutional change." 35 The Gateway
Amendment simplified the revision process by allowing for ratification
of a proposed amendment by approval of two-thirds of the voters who
actually voted upon the proposed amendment.36 While the Gateway
30. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 24, at 13.
31. Id. If anything, revision under the 1870 Constitution became even more difficult.
The 1870 Constitution, for example, prevented the revision of the same article more
than once every four years. Id.; see also BRADEN & COHN, supra note 29, at 565-66. In
addition, subsequent delegates were unsuccessful in their numerous attempts to amend the
constitution.

KENNEY, supra note 21, at 3. Attempts to amend the Illinois Constitution

of 1870 were unsuccessful in 1920, 1934, and 1940. Id.
32. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 24, at 13.
33. JOHN S. JACKSON, ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION, THE
SUFFRAGE, ELECTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION ARTICLES OF THE 1970 ILLINOIS

CONSTITUTION 8 (1987) (a background paper written for the Committee of 50 to Reexamine the Illinois Constitution).
34. The Gateway Amendment received its name because it was expected to ease the
process of constitutional revision. KENNEY, supra note 21, at 3.
35. Id. The Gateway Amendment continued to authorize each house of the General
Assembly to propose amendments, but allowed for the adoption of the proposed
amendment if at the next general election "either a majority of the electors voting at said
election or two-thirds of the electors voting on any such proposed amendment shall vote
for the proposed amendment ...." BRADEN & COHN, supra note 29, at 565 (citing ILL.
CONST. of 1870, art. XIV, § 2).
36. JACKSON, supra note 33, at 8. The requirement in the 1870 Constitution that
proposed amendments be ratified by a "majority of those voting at the election" sufficed
until the introduction of the Australian ballot in 1891. BRADEN & COHN, supra note 29,
at 566. The Australian ballot, for the first time, allowed voters to avoid selecting a
straight-party ticket, because it listed each candidate running for office. Id. As Braden
and Cohn explain:
Prior [to the Australian ballot], each political party printed its own ballot and
a voter who used a party ballot and marked the party circle was counted as
voting for any amendment that was on the ballot. With the adoption of an
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Amendment initially met with some success, the constitution remained
difficult to amend." When the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention convened in 1970, the historical difficulty in amending the
constitution convinced many of the delegates that the populace would
consider the convention a success if it achieved nothing more than a
revision of the amending article. 8
Although the delegates faced numerous complex issues going into
the 1970 convention, one issue in particular influenced the new
constitution's amendment provisions. Specifically, the delegates disputed the composition of the Illinois General Assembly under the
proposed Illinois Constitution of 1970.39 The debate centered on
whether the House of Representatives should be composed of singlemember or multi-member' ° districts consisting of three representatives
elected through "cumulative voting."'" In an effort to resolve the
dispute, the delegates inserted article XIV, section 3 into the constitution. Article XIV, section 3 provides Illinois voters with a
mechanism to change the composition of the legislature through the
use of the popular initiative provision. 42 The adoption of the popular
initiative provision was thus a result of compromise, and the limited
official [Australian] ballot, the amendment question was separately stated and
separately counted.
Id.
Thus, with the adoption of the new ballot, the majority test proved too stringent,
presumably because many voters did not vote upon the amendment. See GRATCH & UBIK,
supra note 24, at 13. As Jackson notes in his background paper on the constitutional
revision process, the fall off in those voting at the top of the ballot compared to those
voting at the bottom, where proposed amendments appear, is usually severe. JACKSON,
supra note 33, at 8.
37. KENNEY, supra note 21, at 4. Only one of eight proposed amendments was
approved in the decade after 1956, leading one commentator to observe at the time that
"if this pace continues, significant revision of the constitution through the normal
amending process will take an incredibly long time." Id.
38. GERTZ & PIsCIOTrE, supra note 25, at 186; see also Williams, supra note 9, at
1123 (describing the 1870 Constitution's inflexible amending procedures).
39. Levine, supra note 9, at 387.
40. See 4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITuTIONAL CONVENTION 2791814 (1970) [hereinafter 4 PROCEEDINGS]. Essentially, the delegates could not agree upon
the size of the General Assembly under the 1970 Constitution. See Williams, supra note
9, at 1123 n.31.
41. In Illinois, cumulative voting was a system in which a voter could cast three
votes for one candidate for the General Assembly, or distribute them equally among three
candidates. See Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 415 N.E.2d
368, 370 (111.1980).
42. Levine, supra note 9, at 388. Levine notes that, in the election for the ratification
of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, Illinois voters retained multi-member districts and
cumulative voting. Id. at 388 n.7.

1995]

CBA v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections

scope of the provision reflects this intention.43 Although the delegates
drafted the popular initiative provision to address the composition of
the General Assembly, nothing within the provision specifically limits
its use to that issue.4
Article XIV, section 345 imposes a number of technical requirements
upon the proponents of a proposed amendment. 6 The proponents
must submit a petition containing the signatures of voters equal to at
least eight percent of those who voted for governor in the preceding
election.47 The proponents may not, however, gather the signatures
more than two years before the general election in which the proponents submit the amendment.48 Furthermore, the petition must
contain the full text of the proposed amendment, and must be filed
with the Secretary of State no later than six months before the general
43. Gordon Levine, counsel for the plaintiffs in the first case to test the scope of
article XIV, § 3, Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 359 N.E.2d
138 (I11.1976), wrote:
To the extent that the delegates could find workable solutions to the problems
presented, those solutions were embodied in the Illinois Constitution of
1970. Often, however, the delegates could not agree on an unequivocal
resolution to a complex problem which would have been acceptable to the
voters of the State of Illinois. Thus, in the best democratic tradition, most
solutions were the result of compromise.
Levine, supra note 9, at 387. But cf. Williams, supra note 9, at 1123 n.31 (noting that
"[iut has been argued that this compromise was more political than philosophical
because it placed the burden of determining the politically difficult question of what size
the legislature would be on the voters, and not on the convention delegates."). Thus, the
delegates were able to side step resolving a difficult political question. Id.
44. Levine, supra note 9, at 388-89. Article XIV, § 3, the popular initiative
provision of the 1970 Constitution provides:
Amendments to Article IV of this Constitution may be proposed by a petition
signed by a number of electors equal in number to at least eight percent of the
total votes cast for candidates for Governor in the preceding gubernatorial
election. Amendments shall be limited to structural and procedural subjects
contained in Article IV. A petition shall contain the text of the proposed
amendment and the date of the general election at which the proposed
amendment is to be submitted, shall have been signed by the petitioning
electors not more than twenty-four months preceding that general election and
shall be filed with the Secretary of State at least six months before that general
election. The procedure for determining the validity and sufficiency of a
petition shall be provided by law. If the petition is valid and sufficient, the
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the electors at that general election
and shall become effective if approved by either three-fifths of those voting
on the amendment or a majority of those voting in the election.
ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
45. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
46. For a discussion of the substantive requirement of article XIV, § 3 see infra part
II.B.
47. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. See supra note 44 for the text of the article.
48. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
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election. 49 If the Secretary of State validates the petition,"0 the proposed amendment is included on the ballot at the general election
specified in the petition. 5' To become effective, the proposed amendment requires approval by "three-fifths of those voting
on the
' 2
amendment or a majority of those voting in the election."
B. Article XIV, Section 3 of the Illinois Constitution of
1970: JudicialInterpretationConcerning its Scope
Article XIV, section 3 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution allows
amendment of the legislative article of the constitution by popular initiative petition. 3 The second sentence of article XIV, section 3
contains the key words used to describe the permissible scope of proposed amendments: "Amendments shall be limited to structural and
procedural subjects contained in Article IV.' 5' 4 Although the 1970
delegates dedicated a considerable amount of debate to discussing the
meaning and purpose of this language, they nevertheless left the scope
of the language open for judicial interpretation. 5 The following Part
discusses the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of the limiting
language in article XIV, section 3.

49. Id. The petition must also contain "the date of the general election at which the
proposed amendment is to be submitted." Id.
50. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 10, § 5/28-9 (West Supp. 1995) (formerly ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 46, para. 28-9 (1991)).
51. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
52. Id.
53. Id. See supra note 44 for the text of article XIV, § 3.
54. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. Seventeen states provide for the amendment of their
constitutions through the use of the initiative provision. Illinois, however, is unique in
limiting the scope of the popular initiative to the legislative article. Those states
allowing for the use of the popular initiative are: Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota. See ARIZ. CONST.
art. XXI, § 1;ARK. CONST. amend. VII; CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8, 10, art. XVIII, § 3;
COLO. CONST. art. V,

§

1; FLA. CONST. art. XI,

§§

3, 5; ILL. CONST. art. XIV,

§

3; MASS.

CONST. amend. XLVIII, pts. 1-4, amend. LXXXI; MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2; Mo. CONST.
art. III, §§ 49-51; MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 9; NEB. CONST. art. Il, §§ 2, 4; NEv. CONST.
art. XIX, §§ 2-4; N.D. CONST. art. III, 88 1-10; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1; OKLA. CONST.
art. V, §§ 1-3; OR. CONsT. art, IV, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. XXIII, §§ 1-3.
55. See, e.g., 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 40, at 2712. Specifically, Delegate Tomei,
the chairman of the Suffrage and Amending Committee at the 1970 convention, stated:
"[W]hether or not [a proposed amendment is] covered under this language or authorized
under this language would probably be a matter for the courts." Id.
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1. Conjunctive Versus Disjunctive Interpretation
Six years passed before the citizens of Illinois had the chance to test
the scope of the popular initiative provision of the 1970 Constitution.56
The Illinois Supreme Court first addressed this issue in Coalitionfor
PoliticalHonesty v. State Board of Elections ("Coalition F').57 This
decision limited the nature of proposed amendments under article XIV,
section 3 of the 1970 Constitution to proposed amendments seeking to
change the structure and procedures of the General Assembly. 8
In Coalition I, the Coalition for Political Honesty (the "Coalition")
filed an initiative petition requesting that the electorate have the opportunity to consider three amendments to the legislative article. 9 The
proposed amendments sought: (1) to tighten the dual-officeholding
requirement in article IV, subsection 2(a) by prohibiting members of
the General Assembly from receiving compensation from other
governmental entities during their terms as members of the General
Assembly; (2) to prohibit a legislator who had a conflict of interest
from voting; and (3) to prohibit members of the General Assembly
from receiving their salaries at the beginning of the term.6°
A group of citizens and taxpayers, consisting of former delegates to
the constitutional convention, perceived the Coalition's proposed
amendments as a "threat to the integrity of the 1970 Constitution.'
The group presented a petition for leave to file a complaint under the
disbursement of public moneys statute 62 in the Circuit Court of Cook
56. In 1973, a group of citizens attempted to utilize the popular initiative to abolish
the practice of cumulative voting in Illinois. William R. Hector, Initiative and
Referendum, in UNDERSTANDING THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION 67, 68 (Frank Kopecky &
Mary S. Harris eds., 1986). The 1973 campaign failed, and it was not until 1976 that the
Illinois Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of a proposed amendment under
article XIV, § 3. Id.
57. 359 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. 1976) (per curiam) [hereinafter Coalition !].
58. Id. at 144.
59. Id. at 139.
60. Id. at 140.
61. Levine, supra note 9, at 393. Six of the seven plaintiffs served as delegates to the
1970 constitutional convention, including Louis J. Perona, who served as the
spokesman for the Committee on the Legislature during the debates. Coalition 1, 359
N.E.2d at 139. The seventh plaintiff, Ann M. Lousin, served on the research staff at the
convention. Id. The plaintiffs were represented by Samuel Witwer, who had presided
over the convention in 1969. Id. For a detailed discussion of the background of the
Coalition I case, see Levine, supra note 9, at 390-97. Levine states that the plaintiffs,
"felt that there had been no intention to permit article XIV, section 3 to be used to place
substantive questions of public policy, meritorious or otherwise, before the voters ...
Id. at 393.
62. At the time the plaintiffs filed their complaint, the disbursement of public
moneys statute was codified at chapter 102, paragraphs 11 through 17 of the Illinois
Revised Statutes. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, paras. 11-17 (1975). Currently, the
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County, seeking to enjoin the State Board of Elections from expending
public funds to place the proposed amendment on the ballot.63
Consequently, the circuit court enjoined the expenditure of public
funds, holding that the proposed amendments failed to meet the
requirements of article XIV, section 3 .64
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's opinion,
holding that the proposed amendments were unconstitutional. 65 Specifically, the court utilized conventional methods of statutory
construction to conclude that article XIV, section 3 required all proposed amendments to involve and be limited to both structural and
procedural subjects contained in the legislative article.'
The court first explained that because the word "and" is normally
construed in the conjunctive, the Coalition would have had to prove
that it was clearly evident that the delegates intended a contrary
meaning when they approved the initiative provision.67 The court
determined, however, that the Coalition failed to meet this burden.68
Instead, the court explained that any change in the legislative article
necessarily involves either the structure or procedures of the General
Assembly. 69 Accordingly, the court reasoned that because all changes
to the legislative article are structural or procedural in character, the
substitution of the word "or" would be the same as removing the
phrase "structural and procedural" from article XIV, section 3.70 The
disbursement of public moneys statute is codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 735,
§§ 5/11-301 to 5/11-304 (West 1992).
63. Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 139. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the expenditure
of approximately $1,750,000 in public funds needed to place the proposed amendment
on the ballot. Id.
64. Id. at 141.
Additionally, the circuit court determined that the proposed
amendments violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of both the Illinois
and United States Constitutions. Id.
65. Id. at 147.
66. Id. at 143-44 (emphasis added). As examples of amendments whose subject would
meet the structural and procedural requirement of article XIV, § 3, the court listed the
conversion from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature and the conversion from multimember to single-member legislative districts. Id. at 144. The Illinois Supreme Court
first determined that the case was ripe for review, despite the fact that the proposed
amendment had not been submitted to the voters. Id. at 142. The ripeness issue will not
be addressed in this Note. For a detailed discussion of the ripeness issue, see Levine,
supra note 9, at 397-402.
67. Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 143-44. But cf. Lawrence Schlam, Legislative Term
Limitation Under a "Limited" PopularInitiative Provision?, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 60
(1993) (questioning the pertinence of the "plain-meaning" rule when plain statutory
language becomes ambiguous in application).
68. Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 144.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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court stated that interpreting the word "and" in the disjunctive, effectively substituting "or" for the word "and," would cause the phrase
"structural and procedural" to become mere surplusage. 71 Therefore,
in order to give "structural and procedural" meaning, the court concluded that the phrase must be interpreted in its conjunctive form. 2
The Coalition I court then examined the convention debates for
further assistance in determining the meaning of the "structural and
procedural" provision in article XIV, section 3.73 The court noted that
the Committee on Suffrage and Constitutional Amendments rejected a
general initiative provision which would have allowed an amendment
to any part of the constitution. 74 Instead, the court explained that the
delegates intended the initiative to involve only the "basic qualities of
the legislative branch-namely structure, size, organization, procedures, etc. 75 Accordingly, the court concluded that its conjunctive
reading of the "structural and procedural" language was necessary to
further the intent behind the initiative provision.76
Finally, the court noted that the Coalition had not argued that the
proposed amendments met the "dual requirements" of article XIV, section 3.7 The Coalition I court implied that each of the proposed
amendments may have involved procedural subjects in the legislative
article, yet none of the amendments involved the structure of the
General Assembly. 78 Thus, the court held that the proposed amendments were unconstitutional under article XIV, section 3.79

71. Id.
72. Id. In so concluding, the court recalled the "fundamental rule" of statutory and
constitutional construction that "each word, clause or sentence must, if possible, be
given some reasonable meaning." Id.
73. Id. at 142. Although the court noted the role that the delegates intended the courts
to play in determining whether a proposed amendment passes the constitutional
requirements, id., the court nevertheless referred extensively to the convention debates
in its opinion, id. at 144-47.
74. Id. at 145.
75. Id. (citing 6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 1400-01).
76. Id. at 147. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that the Committee on Style,
Drafting and Submission's report on the proposed initiative provision was ambiguous,
and noted that the provision could be interpreted to require a disjunctive reading of the
phrase "structural and procedural." Id. at 146-47 (citing 6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12,
at 1561). Furthermore, the court noted that Delegate Whalen's comments regarding the
provision expressed the intention that the provision be read in the disjunctive. Id. at
147 (citing 5 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
4523, 4547 (1970) [hereinafter 5 PROCEEDINGS]).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 146-47.
79. Id. at 147.
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Justice Schaefer dissented from the court's opinion in Coalition I,
finding nothing in the proceedings of the constitutional convention
which suggested that initiatives under article XIV, section 3 were
limited to both structural and procedural subjects of the legislative
article.8" Instead, Justice Schaefer argued for what he considered a
more natural disjunctive reading of the phrase "structural and procedural.'
Justice Schaefer maintained that the popular initiative provision
allows amendment of either structural or procedural subjects as long as
the proposed amendment does not attempt to make substantive changes
to the legislative article.82 He disagreed with the court's contention
that any amendment of the legislative article would necessarily involve
either a structural or procedural subject.83 Rather, Justice Schaefer
noted that several provisions within the legislative article were neither
"structural" nor "procedural. 84 Thus, he concluded that article XIV,
section 3 precludes proposed amendments not involving either a structural or procedural change-those amendments involving substantive
changes to the legislative article. 85
Under Justice Schaefer's disjunctive analysis, therefore, the Coalition's first and third proposals remained unconstitutional because they
failed to involve either structural or procedural subjects. 86 The second
proposal, however, regarding the voting ability of legislators with conflicts of interest, did affect the procedures of the General Assembly
and was, according to dissenting Justice Schaefer, constitutional.87

80. Id. at 148 (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Schaefer, J., dissenting). As examples of the disjunctive use of the word
"and," Justice Schaefer offered the following:
First year students are limited to mathematics and foreign language courses.
The menus will be limited to beef and chicken dishes.
It seems plain that the first illustration does not mean that both
mathematics and a foreign language must be taught in a single course, and that
the second illustration does not mean that every dish must contain both beef
and chicken.
Id. (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Schaefer, J.,dissenting).
83. Id. (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Schaefer, J.,
dissenting). As an example, Justice Schaefer listed the grant of
legislative immunity in article IV, § 12. Id. (Schaefer, J.,dissenting).
85. Id. at 148-49 (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 149 (Schaefer, J., dissenting); see supra note 60 and accompanying text
(discussing the Coalition's proposals).
87. Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 149 (Schaefer, J., dissenting); see supra note 60 and
accompanying text (discussing the Coalition's proposals).
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2. The Initiative Provision as a Self-Interest Check
Upon the Legislature
In 1980, Illinois citizens, frustrated by legislative salary increases,
successfully utilized the initiative provision for the first time, ending
cumulative voting and multi-member districts in the process. 88 In
89
Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections,
("CoalitionIF'), the court retreated slightly from its strict conjunctive
90
reading of article XIV, section 3.
In Coalition II, the Coalition for Political Honesty filed a petition
with the State Board of Elections seeking to utilize the initiative process to place a proposed amendment to article IV on the ballot. 9' As
proposed, the amendment would institute single-member districts and
abolish cumulative voting for representatives. 92 Two individuals,
believing that the limiting "structural and procedural" language of the
popular initiative provision prohibited the proposed amendment, filed
an objectors' petition with the State Board of Elections. 93 Thereafter,
the Coalition sought a writ of mandamus directing the State Board of
Elections to certify the proposed constitutional amendment for submission to the electorate. 94
In discussing the origins of article XIV, section 3, the Illinois
Supreme Court noted, as it did in Coalition I, that the delegates to the
1970 constitutional convention rejected a more general proposal than
the current popular initiative provision, thus limiting the scope of the
initiative.95 The court continued, however, by highlighting that a
majority of the delegates at the convention realized the unique pro-

88. Hector, supra note 56, at 68-69.
89. 415 N.E.2d 368 (111. 1980) [hereinafter Coalition II].
90. Id. Although Coalition I1 mainly involved the constitutionality of the initiative
provision's technical requirements, it also shed some light on the court's interpretation
of the scope of the provision. Id. at 372-74. But see Williams, supra note 9, at 1124
n.39.
91. Coalition II, 415 N.E.2d at 370.
92. Id. The change from multi-member to single-member districts had the effect of
reducing the number of seats in the Illinois House of Representatives from 177 to 118.
Id. at 371. For an explanation of cumulative voting, see supra note 41.
93. Coalition 1I, 415 N.E.2d at 369.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 374 (citing 2 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
587 (1970)). The court noted the validity of consulting the convention debates, stating
that "'the practice of consulting the debates of the members of the convention which
framed the constitution has long been indulged in by courts in determining the meaning
of provisions which are thought to be doubtful."' Id. at 375 (quoting Coalition 1, 359
N.E.2d at 145).
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blems involved in legislative reform.96 Noting that the delegates
adopted the popular initiative provision as a check on legislators' selfinterest, the court stated that the provision should not be construed in a
way that would "inhibit the rights which article XIV confers. 97 The
court then explained that it would not construe article XIV, section 3 in
a way that would eliminate the check on legislators' self-interest that
the provision's drafters intended. 98 Thus, the court held that the proposed amendment was within the intended scope of the initiative
provision because it related "directly to the ultimate purpose' 99
of structural and procedural change in the House of Representatives.
3. The Rise of the Substantive Changes Analysis
After Coalition1, subsequent attempts to amend the Illinois Constitution through the initiative process were unsuccessful.' 00 Even
though the Illinois Supreme Court and one Illinois appellate court
recognized the conjunctive "structural and procedural" test set forth in
CoalitionI, courts nevertheless began to apply a "substantive changes
analysis" based upon Justice Schaefer's dissenting opinion in Coalition .o0t
96. Id. at 374. Delegate Perona summarized the unique problems of legislative reform
discussed by the court:
"This provision has been structured to apply only to the legislative article and
to be limited to the area of government which it is most likely will not be
changed in the constitution by amendment. The legislature, being composed
of human beings, will. be reluctant to change the provisions of the
constitution that govern its structure and makeup, the number of its members,
and those sort of provisions.
In other areas of the constitution I think it has been demonstrated that the
General Assembly has and will submit changes without the concern of their
vested interest in the situation."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 40, at 2911).
97. Id. at 375. The court first noted that "'[n]o right is more precious in a free country
than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as
good citizens, we must live."' Id. at 376 (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17
(1964)). Then, the court asserted that "the rights of those who seek to exercise their
constitutional privilege to initiate an amendment to that constitution are intertwined
with the rights of those who vote thereon." Id.
98. Id. at 375.
99. Id. at 382.
100. See, e.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n v. State Bd. of Elections, 561 N.E.2d 50 (I11.
1990) [hereinafter CBA 1]; Lousin v. State Bd. of Elections, 438 N.E.2d 1241 (I11.
App.
1st Dist. 1982). For a discussion of the CBA I case, see infra notes 113-25 and
accompanying text.
For a discussion of Lousin, see infra notes 102-12 and
accompanying text.
101. See CBA 1,561 N.E.2d at 56; Lousin, 438 N.E.2d at 1246.
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In Lousin v. State Board of Elections,10 2 the Coalition for Political
Honesty filed a popular initiative petition proposing an amendment to
the legislative article to allow voters to introduce bills to the General
Assembly by initiative. 0 3 A group of citizens filed a complaint to
enjoin the proponents of the amendment from expending public funds
to prepare for an election on the proposed amendments."~
Before addressing the specific proposed amendment, the appellate
court recalled much of the Coalition I discussion regarding the convention debates, and emphasized that the convention declined to
propose a general initiative that would have allowed amendments by
initiative to any part of the constitution. 5 Instead of allowing a
general initiative, the court explained that the convention liberalized the
other methods of constitutional revision.' °6 Additionally, the appellate
court noted that the delegates were concerned that special interest
groups could abuse a general initiative by seeking to write ordinary
legislation into the constitution.1 t 7
In addressing the Coalition's proposed amendment in Lousin, the
appellate court purported to apply the conjunctive "structural and procedural" test set forth in Coalition Po8 The appellate court concluded
that the proposed amendment was a substantive change affecting the
legislative power enumerated in article IV, rather than any of the
structural and procedural subjects contained in the legislative article."
Because the amendment was to shift legislative power from the
General Assembly to the voters, the court held that the proposed
amendment was beyond the intended scope of the initiative provision."° In so holding, the appellate court adopted the reasoning of
Justice Schaefer's Coalition I dissent, which asserted that initiatives

102. 438 N.E.2d 1241 (Il. App. 1st Dist. 1982).
103. Id. at 1242. The proposed amendment would have allowed citizens to introduce
bills dealing with any subject into the General Assembly if the bill received the
signatures of at least six percent of those who voted in the last gubernatorial election.
Id. at 1243.
104. Id. at 1244. All the plaintiffs were involved in the Sixth Illinois Constitutional
Convention in 1970. Id.
105. Id. at 1245-46.
106. Id. at 1245. For example, the convention adopted a provision requiring the
periodic submission to the electorate of the question of whether to call for a
constitutional convention. Id. (citing ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1).
107. Id. at 1245-46 (citing 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 2298 (1970) [hereinafter 7 PROCEEDINGS]).
108. Id. at 1246.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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could not propose substantive changes to the legislative article."' The
appellate court, however, failed to address Justice Schaefer's dis"structural and procedural" language in the
junctive reading of 1the
2
initiative provision.'
After the Lousin decision, the next opportunity for an Illinois court
to consider the initiative provision came in ChicagoBarAssociation v.
State Board of Elections ("CBA P,)."3 The Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in CBA I, however, failed to resolve the issue. In CBA I, the
Tax Accountability Amendment Committee (the "TAAC") filed a
petition with the Secretary of State proposing the Tax Accountability
Amendment. 14 The proposed amendment would require that threefifths of the members in each house of the General Assembly approve
any bill increasing the revenue of the state." 15 The Chicago Bar
Association (the "CBA") objected, and filed a complaint seeking to
enjoin the spending of public funds to place the proposed amendment
on the ballot."l 6 After the circuit court entered summary judgment for
the TAAC, the CBA appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court." 7
The TAAC argued that the proposed amendment affected the structure of the legislature because the amendment required the General
Assembly to maintain a revenue committee. 18 Furthermore, the
TAAC argued that the amendment's provision affected the procedures
of the General Assembly." 9 Nevertheless, the supreme court refused
to address the conjunctive "structural and procedural" test set forth in
Coalition I, stating that even if the TAAC was correct in asserting that
the amendment affected both the structural and procedural subjects
contained in the legislative article, it was not limited to those subS111. Id. (citing Coalition I, 359 N.E.2d at 148-49 (Schaefer, J.,dissenting)). The
appellate court quoted Justice Schaefer, who maintained that the "initiative process could
not be used to alter or change the power of the legislature." Id. (citing Coalition 1, 359
N.E.2d at 148-49 (Schaefer, J., dissenting)). Additionally, the appellate court
recognized that the legislative article contains subjects that are neither structural nor
procedural in nature. Id.
112. Id. See also Williams, supra note 9, at 1128-29 (discussing the Lousin court's
interpretation of Coalition 1, and noting that the appellate court treated Justice
Schaefer's substantive changes analysis in his Coalition I dissent "as controlling").
113. 561 N.E.2d 50 (Ill. 1990). For an in-depth discussion of this case, see
Williams, supra note 9,at 1129.
114. CBA 1, 561 N.E.2d at 51.
115. Id.at 52.
116. Id.at 51.
117. Id.at 52.
118. Id.at 53.
119. Id. This argument centered on the provision in the amendment that the revenue
committee may not vote upon a bill until after a public hearing. Id.
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jects.' 20 Instead, the court concluded that the proposed amendment
contained substantive matters outside the legislative article.' 2 ' Thus,
the supreme court held that the proposed amendment failed to meet the
requirements of article XIV, section 3.122 By failing to apply the
CoalitionI court's conjunctive "structural and procedural" test, 23 and
by opting instead for the substantive changes reasoning in Justice
Schaefer's Coalition I dissent, 24 the CBA I court failed to clarify the
standard that future non-substantive initiative proposals must meet in
order to pass constitutional muster.'2'
HI. DISCUSSION
Prior to its decision in Chicago Bar Association v. Illinois State
Board of Elections ( "CBA I/"), 126 the Illinois Supreme Court, which
narrowly interpreted the popular initiative provision, had provided little
guidance as to what amendments were permissible under the "structural and procedural" guidelines. 127 In CBA 11, the court applied the
"structural and procedural" language of article XIV, section 3 to a
proposed term-limit amendment and concluded that28 the amendment
was not a proper subject for the initiative provision.

120. Id. at 56. The court reiterated the holding in Lousin that the initiative provision
may not effect substantive changes in the power of the legislature. Id. at 53 (citing
Lousin, 438 N.E.2d at 1246). Furthermore, the court cited Justice Schaefer's dissent in
Coalition I for the proposition that the delegates limited the article XIV, § 3 initiative
provision to prevent it from being used to achieve substantive legislation. Id. at 56
(citing Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 148 (Schaefer, J.,dissenting)).
12 1. Id. at 56. The court stated:
Almost any substantive issue could be fit within the outlines of structural and
procedural changes to subjects of the legislative article crafted by the TAAC.
One need only provide in a proposed Amendment for the creation in each
house of a special committee, provide for its membership, require notice and
hearing on bills referred to the committee, and require a certain vote in each
house for passage of such bills. This, according to the argument of the TAAC,
would satisfy the structural and procedural requirements of section 3 of article
XIV.
Id.
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
125. See Williams, supra note 9, at 1137.
126. 641 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1994) (per curiam) (4-3 decision); see supra note 5.
127. See supra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
128. CBA I, 641 N.E.2d at 529.
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A. The Facts and the Lower Court Opinion
In CBA II, two organizations, the Eight is Enough Committee and
Term Limits Illinois (collectively referred to as "Proponents"),
attempted to amend article IV of the Illinois Constitution. 29 The
Proponents circulated a petition pursuant to article XIV, section 3 of
the Illinois Constitution. 130 They accumulated 437,088 signatures, a
number representing thirteen percent of those who voted in the
preceding gubernatorial election of 1992, 31 and therefore exceeded the
eight-percent signature requirement in article XIV, section 3.132 The
Proponents sought to amend article IV, subsections 2(a), 2(b), and
2(c) of the Illinois Constitution, 133 by imposing an eight-year limit on
the total number of years a legislator could serve in the General
Assembly. 34 Within the required time limit, 135 the Proponents filed a
petition with the Secretary of State, who forwarded the petition to the
129. Id. at 526.
130. Id. at 527.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 528; see ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. Article XIV, § 3 requires a petition to
be signed by the number of electors equal to at least eight percent of the total votes cast
for Governor in the preceding gubernatorial election. See supra notes 45-52 and
accompanying text for further discussion of the provision's technical requirements.
When the State Board of Elections conducted a sample check of the signatures on the
petition, however, it projected that only 268,896 of the signatures were valid. Rick
Pearson, Paid Petition Passers Sign on Just About Anywhere, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 1994,
§ 1, at 1. The State Board of Elections attributed some of the invalid signatures to the
efforts of paid petition passers hired by Term Limits Illinois to distribute the petition.
Id. Although the Proponents still surpassed the threshold number of signatures required
under article XIV, § 3, the significant number of invalid signatures demonstrates the
difficulty in assessing the validity of initiative petitions.
133. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(a)-(c).
134. CBA 1I, 641 N.E.2d at 527. The proposed amendment sought to add the
following language to article IV, section 2:
(a) . . . For the exclusive purpose of calculating [length] of service under the
tenure limitation contained in Section 2(c), a person who serves two years or
less of a term of a Senator shall be deemed to have served two years and a
person who serves more than two years of a four-year term of a Senator shall
be deemed to have served four years.
(b) . . . For the exclusive purpose of calculating length of service under the
tenure limitation contained in Section 2(c), a person who serves any part of a
term of a Representative shall be deemed to have served two years.
(c) . . . No person shall be eligible to serve as a member of the General
Assembly for more than eight years. No person who has served six years in
the General Assembly shall be eligible to be elected to a four-year term as a
Senator. This tenure limitation is not retroactive and shall not apply to
service as a member of the General Assembly before the second Wednesday in
January, 1995 ....
Id. at 526-27.
135. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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State Board of Elections (the "Board") for a determination as to its
validity under the Election Code. 136 The Board received no objections
to the petition, and the sample verification revealed enough valid
signatures so that the proposed amendment could be placed on the
November 8, 1994 ballot.137

Before the Board declared the petition officially valid, however, the
CBA initiated two separate legal proceedings, alleging in both that the
proposed amendment did not meet the requirements of article XIV,
section 3.138 In the first proceeding, the CBA filed a taxpayers' action
in the Cook County Circuit Court under the disbursement of public
moneys statute,139 seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief. 40 In the second proceeding, the CBA brought an original
141
action in the Illinois Supreme Court, seeking a writ of mandamus.
In each action, the CBA named as defendants the Board, the State
Comptroller, the State Treasurer, the Secretary of State, the Cook
County Clerk, and the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners (collectively referred to as the "Officials").' 42
In the taxpayers' action, the circuit court declared the proposed
amendment invalid and permanently enjoined the expenditure of state
funds for the amendment. 143 Additionally, the circuit court entered an
automatic notice of appeal.' 44 The trial court then transferred the
136. CBA I1, 641 N.E.2d at 527; see ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 10, §§ 5/1-1 to 5/303 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); id. § 5/28-11 (West 1993). Chapter 10 sets forth the
procedures for determining the validity of petition signatures. Id. Under the statute, a
signature is valid if the Board determines that "the person who signed the petition is a
registered voter in that election jurisdiction or was a registered voter therein on the date
the petition was signed." Id. If, for example, 437,000 signatures appeared, the Board
would verify 10% of the signatures in this fashion. See id.
137. CBA II, 641 N.E.2d at 531 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Harrison, J., dissenting).
139. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, §§ 5/11-301 to 5/11-303 (West 1992). The
disbursement of public moneys statute confers standing upon any taxpaying citizen to
bring an "action to restrain and enjoin" the spending of the State's public funds. Id.
§ 5/11-303; see also CBA 11, 641 N.E.2d at 531-32 (Harrison, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the proponents of the proposed term-limit amendment had standing to
file suit in the circuit court to prevent the amendment from being placed on the ballot).
140. CBA II, 641 N.E.2d at 527.
141. Id. A writ of mandamus "issues from a court of superior jurisdiction, and is
directed to . . . an executive, administrative or judicial officer . . . commanding the
performance of a particular act therein specified .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 961
(6th ed. 1990).
142. CBA 11, 641 N.E.2d at 527. The trial court allowed the proponents to intervene
as defendants and respondents. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The trial court entered the notice of appeal pursuant to the supreme court's
order. Id.
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appeal directly to the Illinois Supreme Court and consolidated the
pending mandamus proceeding with the appeal.'45
B. The Illinois Supreme Court's Opinion
Before discussing the substantive issues concerning the popular
initiative, the supreme court dismissed the CBA's mandamus proceeding.' 46 The court reasoned that because a "writ of mandamus
commands a public officer to perform an official, nondiscretionary
duty that the petitioner is entitled to have performed," it provides affirmative, not prohibitory relief.' 47 Accordingly, because the CBA was
seeking to prohibit the officials from placing the proposed amendment
on the ballot, the court concluded that the only proper action was the
taxpayers' action for injunctive relief." s
In the taxpayers' action, the CBA argued that the proposed amendment fell outside the scope of article XIV, section 3 of the Illinois
Constitution because it affected neither the General Assembly's
structure nor its procedure. 4 9 The supreme court agreed, essentially
echoing its holding in Coalition 1.150 Reiterating that the word "and" in
the "structural and procedural" requirement is interpreted in the con145. Id. The supreme court heard oral arguments in the mandamus proceeding during a
special hearing on July 21, 1994. Id. at 531 (Harrison, J., dissenting). At the hearing,
the court first learned of the existence of the taxpayers' action and ordered the circuit
court to enter a judgment in the taxpayers' action the next day. Id. (Harrison, J.,
dissenting).
146. Id. at 527 (Harrison, J., dissenting). The court agreed with Justice Harrison's
dissent regarding the mandamus issue. Id. at 532 (Harrison, J., dissenting); see infra
part III.C.
147. CBA II, 641 N.E.2d 527 (citing Madden v. Cronson, 501 N.E.2d 1267, 1272
(Ill. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 818 (1987)).
148. Id. at 528. In reaching this conclusion, the court explained that "no party has
alleged that any of the officials have failed to perform any official duty related to the
proposed amendment." Id.
149. Id. Specifically, the CBA argued "that the proposed amendment does not affect
either the General Assembly's structure or procedure and certainly not both." Id.
150. Id. The court explained:
"As commonly understood, the word 'and' would thus limit initiatives to
amendments whose subjects would be both structural and procedural, such as a
proposal for the conversion from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature or for
the conversion from multiple - to single-member legislative districts. Giving
effect to the language of section 3 would produce no absurdity or unreasonable
result. This court is without authority to substitute 'or' for the 'and' the
constitutional convention used in stating 'structural and procedural' unless a
contrary intention is clearly manifested. We judge a contrary intention is not
clearly manifested."
Id. at 529 (quoting Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 144). In the court's view, therefore, "[tihe
controlling legal principles are settled." Id. at 528. See supra notes 57-87 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Coalition I.
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junctive sense, the court concluded that the word "and" limited
initiatives to amendments whose subjects were both structural and procedural. 5 ' The court reasoned that the delegates at the constitutional
convention intended a narrow reading of the clause because of their
concern that a broad initiative provision would be subject to abuse.' 52
Applying its narrow construction to the amendment at issue, the
supreme court concluded that the term-limit proposal did not meet the
structural and procedural requirement of article XIV, section 3.53 The
court first characterized the subject of the amendment-term limits-as
affecting the eligibility or qualifications of the individual members of
the General Assembly. 154 The court then reasoned that eligibility and
qualifications do not involve "the structure of the legislature as an
institution" 55 based on its view that the General Assembly's organization would remain the same-a bicameral legislative body with a
total of 177 members.' 56 Similarly, the court opined that the eligibility
or qualifications of individual legislators does not involve the process
by which the General Assembly adopts
a law and thus does not affect
7
the General Assembly's procedures.
The supreme court next addressed the doctrine of stare decisis,
stating that the doctrine "ensure[s] that the law will not merely change
58
erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion."'
The court maintained that in order to preserve the integrity of the
15 1. CBA H1, 641 N.E.2d at 528-29 (citing Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 144).
152. Id. at 528. The court echoed the concern of several delegates at the convention,
that a broad, general initiative provision "'would be subject to abuse by special interest
groups and might result in hasty and ill-conceived attempts to write what should have
been the subject of ordinary legislation into the Constitution."' Id. (quoting Coalition
1, 359 N.E.2d at 145).
153. Id. at 529. In so concluding, the court maintained that the term-limit
amendment would fail not only the strict conjunctive reading of article XIV, § 3, but the
dissent's disjunctive interpretation as well. Id.; see infra note 161 and accompanying
text.
154. CBA H1, 641 N.E.2d at 529. The court failed to elaborate as to how term limits
would affect the eligibility and qualifications of state legislators. Clearly, however,
under the proposed amendment, any person who served more than eight years in the
General Assembly would be ineligible to serve another term. See also Schlam, supra
note 67, at 67 (explaining that a term-limit amendment would affect the eligibility of
legislators).
155. CBA II, 641 N.E.2d at 529.
156. Id.
157. Id. The court explained that, under the proposed amendment, "[tihe process by
which the General Assembly adopts a law would remain unchanged." Id.
158. Id. Furthermore, the court explained that: "Stare decisis permits society to
presume that fundamental principles are established in the law rather than in the
proclivities of individuals." Id. "Stare decisis" is defined as "[tlo abide by, or adhere to,
decided cases." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
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constitutional system of government, it would depart from the doctrine
of stare decisis only with special justification.I59 According to the
supreme court, the Proponents failed to present the requisite special
justification needed to depart from the court's holding in Coalition .160
Thus, the court invalidated the proposed amendment, holding that the
proposed term-limit amendment did not meet the structural and procedural requirement of article XIV, section 3.161
C. Justice Harrison'sDissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harrison 62 maintained that the
proposed amendment properly fell within the popular initiative provision of article XIV. 163 Justice Harrison argued that the court
incorrectly construed the word "and" in the "structural and procedural"
provision.164 Relying upon principles of construction and English
usage, as set forth in Justice Schaefer's dissent in CoalitionI, together
with the published reports of the constitutional convention debates,
need not deal
Justice Harrison concluded that the proposed amendment
65
1
subjects.
structural
and
with both procedural
Furthermore, Justice Harrison emphasized that the main reason the
delegates included the "structural and procedural" language in the
popular initiative provision was "'to prevent use of [the] initiative
amendment to add substantive matter to the Constitution.'"1 66 Justice
159. CBA II, 641 N.E.2d at 529 (citing Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212
(1984), where the court noted an example of a "special justification" found in Swift v.
Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965) (overruling an important procedural principle that
was found to be unworkable in practice)).
160. Id. Recognizing that "[sitare decisis is not an inexorable command ... a court
will detour from the straight path of stare decisis only for articulable reasons, and only
when the court must bring its decisions into agreement with experience and newly
ascertained facts." Id.
161. Id. The court explained that the holding in the case would not change because
the proposed amendment failed both structural and procedural requirements, "[e]ven if the
word 'and' in the 'structural and procedural' language meant 'or."' Id.
162. Justices Miller and Heiple joined in Justice Harrison's dissenting opinion. Id.
at 534 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 533 (Harrison, J., dissenting). Following Justice Schaefer's dissent in
Coalition I, Justice Harrison rejected the court's interpretation as "untenable." Id.
(Harrison, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Harrison, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Harrison, J., dissenting) (citing Coalition I, 359 N.E.2d at 148-49
(Schaefer, J., dissenting)); see supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text; infra note 169
and accompanying text.
166. CBA I1, 641 N.E.2d at 533 (Harrison, J., dissenting) (quoting 6 PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 12, at 1561). Justice Harrison pointed out that the court in CBA I recognized
that "'the proposal and the debates reflected the intent that the limited initiative not be
used to accomplish substantive changes in the constitution . . . ."' Id. (Harrison, J.,
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Harrison argued that the term-limit amendment did not propose a
substantive change in the legislative article. 67 Instead, he maintained
that changes inherent in the term-limit proposal contemplated changes
in the composition of the General Assembly. 168 Justice Harrison noted
that the delegates at the constitutional convention expressly mentioned
the composition of the General Assembly as a "critical
area" subject to
69
1
provision.
initiative
popular
the
under
amendment
Justice Harrison then addressed the CBA's argument that the Proponents had not limited the proposed term-limit amendment to the
structural or procedural subjects within article XIV, section 3.170
Specifically, the CBA contended that the amendment was improper
because it would impair rights created by other constitutional provisions outside the legislative article.' 7' Furthermore, the CBA argued
that in narrowing the class of individuals eligible to run for the General
Assembly, the term-limit amendment would impair the constitutional
right to vote, the right to associate with others for
political purposes,
172
and a candidate's right to be named on the ballot.
Justice Harrison maintained, however, that these same rights would
be involved in an amendment proposal to change the General Assembly from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature-an amendment
the 1970 convention delegates believed would be proper under article
XIV, section 3.173 Furthermore, Justice Harrison explained that aldissenting) (quoting CBA 1, 561 N.E.2d at 55).
167. Id. (Harrison, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (Harrison, J., dissenting). The provisions pertaining to the composition of
the General Assembly are contained in the Illinois Constitution at article IV, § 2.
169. CBA 1I, 641 N.E.2d at 533-34. (Harrison, J., dissenting) (quoting 4
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 40, at 2712).
As to the scope of legislative provisions
contained within the initiative, the convention transcripts provide insight as to what
the delegates intended:
MR. TOMEI:
All right. And would the same be true for questions of election?
And I amplify that by saying that you refer to structure, size, et
cetera; and under the pertinent sections of this proposed article,
the first grouping of them-power, structure, composition, and
apportionment-you do deal with size and with elections. You
deal with cumulative voting-matters of that nature-and is that
the kind of thing, also, that would be subject to initiative under
this proposed section ... ?
MR. PERONA: Yes. Those are the critical areas, actually.
4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 40, at 2712.
170. CBA H, 641 N.E.2d at 534 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
17 1. Id. (Harrison, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (Harrison, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 533-34 (Harrison, J., dissenting) (citing 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 40, at
2711-12). Justice Harrison noted that the CBA conceded that the change from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature was a proper subject under the initiative provision.
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though the CBA admitted that a proposed amendment to change the
structure of the General Assembly from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature would be proper, the CBA failed to distinguish how the
rights involved in that change would 74
differ from the rights involved in
the proposed term-limit amendment.
Finally, Justice Harrison stressed that almost every structural
change to the legislature would have "at least some residual effects on
the right of candidates to run for election and the right of voters to cast
ballots for the candidates of their choice."'175 Thus, Justice Harrison
explained that under the court's conjunctive construction of the initiative provision, almost no proposed amendment could meet the
"structural and procedural" requirement of article XIV, section 3.176
He stated that the court's opinion essentially strips the constitution of a
check upon the General Assembly. 177 Justice Harrison concluded that
it is unlikely that the General Assembly would pass a term-limit
amendment on its own, and thus without the initiative,
Illinois will
78
never be able to realize a term-limit amendment.
IV. ANALYSIS
In CBA II, the supreme court reaffirmed its conjunctive interpretation of the "structural and procedural" requirement in article XIV,
section 3 before holding that the proposed term-limit amendment did
not meet this requirement. 79 Moreover, even if a disjunctive reading
of the "structural and procedural" requirement applied, the court determined that the proposed term-limit amendment would affect neither the
Id. (Harrison, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 534 (Harrison, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Harrison stated that
the CBA failed to distinguish the court's decision in Coalition H. Id. (Harrison, J.,
dissenting); see supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
175. CBA II, 641 N.E.2d at 534 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (Harrison, J.,dissenting).
177. Id. (Harrison, J., dissenting) (citing Coalition II, 415 N.E.2d at 375).
178. Id. (Harrison, J.,dissenting). Specifically, Justice Harrison stated that
regardless of the wisdom behind term limits, the popular initiative:
[R]eserved to the people of th[e] [sitate the right to advance this amendment
and to vote on it once the technical requirements of the Election Code were
satisfied, as they were here. While there may be legitimate legal defects in the
proposed amendment, none have been advanced by the CBA in this case and
none warrant the extraordinary measure of barring the matter from the
November 8 ballot. Democracy should be permitted to takes its course, as the
drafters of our constitution intended. To hold that the law mandates a contrary
result is a fiction that venerates the power of our incumbent legislators and
demeans the intelligence of their constituents.
Id. (Harrison, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 529; see supra part II.B. l and notes 146-152 and accompanying text.
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structure nor the procedures of the General Assembly.' 80 Thus, the
court would have reached the same conclusion regardless of how it
interpreted the provision.
Although the court determined that the proposed term-limit amendment affected neither structure nor procedure, it failed to explain its
reasoning. Furthermore, the court dismissed Justice Harrison's
dissent, reasoning that his reliance on a dissenting opinion 8 ' rendered
his own reasoning invalid and was "not the law as declared by th[e]
court."' 182 This Part analyzes the problems in the court's CBA 11
decision, focusing on the court's interpretation of the intent behind
article XIV, section 3 and the court's rejection of its prior implicit
reliance upon the dissent in CoalitionI.
A.

PlainMeaning OvershadowsIntent

In CBA II, the Illinois Supreme Court attempted to resolve the
debate over the scope of the popular initiative simply by relying upon
the plain language in the constitution.'83 Despite the court's holding,
the question remains as to whether the word "and" in "structural and
procedural" must plainly be construed in the conjunctive sense. To
answer in the affirmative, one must take the position that a disjunctive
interpretation of the word "and" is "strained" or unlikely.l14
In previous decisions, the court has recognized that the true inquiry
in construing a constitutional provision involves examining the intent
of those who adopted the provision.'85 Illinois courts frequently con180. CBA 11, 641 N.E.2d at 529; see supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text.
181. Justice Harrison's dissent relied in part upon Justice Schaefer's dissent in
Coalition 1.See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
182. CBA If, 641 N.E.2d at 529.
183. Id.
184. Schlam, supra note 67, at 60. As Professor Schlam states:
"[Interpretation] involves far more than picking out dictionary definitions...
Consideration of the context and the setting is indispensable properly to
ascertain a meaning.
In saying that a verbal expression is plain or
unambiguous, we mean little more than that we are convinced that virtually
anyone competent to understand it, and desiring fairly and impartially to
ascertain its signification, would attribute to the expression in its context a
meaning such as the one we derive, rather than any other ......
Id. (quoting Hutton v. Phillips, 70 A.2d 15, 17 (Del. Super. Ct. 1949)) (alteration in
original). Would anyone wishing "fairly and impartially" to ascertain the meaning of
the word "and" in the phrase "structural and procedural" assign to it a disjunctive
interpretation? Professor Schlam answers in the affirmative, noting that Justice
Schaefer utilized a disjunctive interpretation in Coalition I. Id. at 61.
185. See People ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane, 150 N.E.2d 168, 172 (Ill.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 829 (1958) (noting that the primary objective in the construction of a statute
or constitution is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers).
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sult the debates of the members of constitutional conventions in
determining the meaning of doubtful provisions. 86 Nevertheless, in
CBA H, the Illinois Supreme Court neglected to reconsider the
meaning that the framers of the constitution may have intended in
enacting article XIV, section 3."' A careful reconsideration of the
1970 convention transcripts provides a powerful argument in favor of
a less strict reading of the "structural and procedural" requirement
in
188
the initiative provision than the one that the court employed.
Illinois has never provided for a broad use of the initiative provision, and the record of convention debates clearly illustrates that the
delegates intended a limited use of article XIV, section 3.189 For
example, a majority of delegates on the Committee on Suffrage and
Constitutional Amending at the 1970 constitutional convention voted
against a general initiative for all parts of the constitution.' 9 Ultimately, the delegates instituted a limited initiative provision-a "safety
mechanism"'' through which Illinois voters could amend the legislative article regardless of the actions of the General Assembly."9
While discussing the proposed initiative clause, however, Delegate
Perona, a member of the Committee on Suffrage and Constitutional
Amending, observed that the initiative would allow voters to address
issues which the General Assembly would be least likely to address
because of its vested interest in its own makeup. 93 The delegates
186. See, e.g., id.; see also Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 144-45 (explaining the need
to examine the framer's intent in interpreting ambiguous terms).
187. The court failed to cite any language from the debates on the popular initiative
provision at the 1970 convention. Instead, the court relied upon its interpretation of
the framer's intent set forth in Coalition 1. CBA 11, 641 N.E.2d at 528 (citing Coalition
1, 359 N.E.2d at 145); see supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing the
Coalition I court's examination of the convention debates on the meaning of the
"structure and procedural" provision).
188. The debates indicate that the delegates were less concerned that the initiative
provision be drafted in the conjunctive sense, and more concerned that the provision
should "'prevent [the] use of [the] initiative amendment to add substantive matter to the
Constitution.'" ld. at 533 (quoting 6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 1561).
189. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 40, at 2710-11. The delegates discussed the
problems inherent in the initiative method of constitutional amendment. Id. For
example, Delegate Pappas expressed her concern that the popular initiative would
become a method the citizens would use to circumvent the General Assembly, "the very
body that has been elected and constituted to act on .. . matters of public policy." Id. at
2710.
190. 7 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 107, at 2298.
191. Brian W. Allen, Illinois Supreme Court Review, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 122, 131
(1978).
192. Id.
193. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 40, at 2710. In explaining why the Committee on
Suffrage and Constitutional Amending provided for a limited popular initiative, Delegate
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indicated that an initiative provision limited to the legislative article
would prevent the use of the provision by special interest groups to
194
pass legislation which should occur through the use of statutes.
Therefore, rather than emphasizing that proposed amendments would
be limited to structural and procedural subjects in the legislative article,
the delegates wanted to prevent the initiative provision from providing
a method for implementing substantive policy.' 95
The delegates' reasoning for limiting the initiative to "structural and
procedural" subjects in the legislative article-to prohibit substantive
changes in the constitution-suggests that any amendment proposing a
change in the legislative article, but not involving an issue of substantive law, should be within the scope of article XIV, section 3.196
Nevertheless, in adopting a strict conjunctive interpretation of the
"structural and procedural" requirement, the supreme court in CBA II
ignored the delegates refusal to revise the initiative provision to reflect
explicitly a conjunctive interpretation. 97 Accordingly, the court's requirement that the proposed amendment affect both structural and
procedural aspects of the General Assembly restricts the use of the
popular initiative beyond the intent of the convention delegates. A less
Perona explained that "it's unlikely that the legislature would propose an amendment
reducing the number of legislators or in changing from cumulative voting . . . to singlemember districts." Id.
194. See id. at 2711. Delegate Perona commented: "If you get too specific with the
limitation, you inhibit the possibility of change within the legislative setup; and if you
leave it broad, of course, they say, 'Well, you might be able to bring in something else
under it."' Id.
195. 6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 1400. The Committee on Suffrage and
Constitutional Amending proposal for what would ultimately become article XIV, § 3
explained that any amendment proposed under the initiative provision "would be
required to be limited to subjects contained in the Legislative Article, namely matters of
structure and procedure and not matters of substantive policy." Id.
196. See Allen, supra note 191, at 131. As an example of an impermissible
substantive change, Allen mentions "[a]n amendment of the constitutional provision
concerning special legislation." Id. at 131 n.59 (citing ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 13).
197. See Coalition I, 359 N.E.2d at 149 (Schaefer, J., dissenting) (citing 5
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 76, at 4547).
Specifically, the delegates failed to adopt
language that would have changed the initiative provision to read, "'Amendments
proposed by petition shall be limited to the structure of the General Assembly and to
procedural provisions affected by changes in structure."' Id. (quoting 6 PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 12, at 1561). But cf Schlam, supra note 67, at 61-62 n.249 (maintaining
that legislative intent should not be inferred from the rejection of a "proposed
amendment to a pending bill"). Justice Schaefer, in rejecting the court's conjunctive
reading, "said that he could 'not find anything in the proceedings . . . [of the]
convention which suggests that no change in any of the numerous procedural provisions
of article IV can be brought about by initiative unless the same amendment brings about
a change in the structure of the legislative body."' Id. at 63 n.256 (quoting Coalition 1,
359 N.E.2d at 148 (Schaefer, J., dissenting)).
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strict approach, focusing on whether the proposed amendment involves an issue of substantive law, would be consistent with the
198
delegates' intent, and would continue to prevent substantive changes
to the constitution that the delegates feared. 99
B. PreviousAdoption of the Coalition I Dissent
Although the Illinois Supreme Court has previously relied on the
CoalitionI dissent when interpreting the initiative provision," in CBA
II the court rejected Justice Harrison's dissent because it relied on the
Coalition I dissent.20' Had the court continued down the path of its
earlier decisions, it too would have applied the substantive changes test
set forth in Justice Schaefer's Coalition I dissent. 0 2 Instead, the court
stated that stare decisis dictated the application of the court's decision
in Coalition I, barring special justification to the contrary.0 3
In Coalition I, the court established a strict conjunctive test for
determining the constitutionality of proposed amendments. 2° Subsequently, in Lousin, an Illinois appellate court, while purporting to
apply the Coalition I test, essentially applied the substantive changes
198. 6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 1400.
199. See Schlam, supra note 67, at 67-68. CBA I provides an example of how
focusing on whether an amendment changes substantive law prevents legislation by
initiative. Here, the court held a proposed amendment to the legislative article to be
unconstitutional. CBA 1, 561 N.E.2d at 56. The court did so, not because the proposal
failed the "structural and procedural" requirement, but because it attempted substantive
changes to the legislative article. Id.; see supra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
201. CBA H, 641 N.E.2d at 529. In rejecting Justice Harrison's dissent, the court
stated that "fundamentally, the dissent relies upon a dissent and not the law as declared
by this court." Id.
202. In discussing whether a proposed term-limit amendment would satisfy article
XIV, § 3, Schlam analyzed a term-limit amendment using both the strict conjunctive test
and the substantive changes test, stating:
This sort of amendment would impact the eligibility of legislators, the manner
and method of their selection, and certainly matters of seniority and
administrative organization. Term limits would be a change not likely to be
initiated by the legislature and would not be a substantive matter, i.e., one
seeking modification of substantive law or constitutional policy. . . . The
amendment would probably satisfy the current conjunctive test by meeting the
structural change requirement "and, of necessity, [incidentally affecting] the
procedure of the General Assembly," i.e., there most likely would be
"structural" changes and "procedural provisions affected by changes in the
structure."
Schlam, supra note 67, at 67 (citations omitted).
203. CBA 11, 641 N.E.2d at 529. According to the supreme court, the Proponents had
not advanced the special justification necessary to overcome the doctrine of stare
decisis. Id.
204. Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 147; see supra notes 57-79 and accompanying text.
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test set forth in Justice Schaefer's Coalition I dissent. 0 5 Then, in
CBA I, the Illinois Supreme Court implicitly adopted Justice
Schaefer's Coalition I dissent by relying on the Illinois appellate
court's Lousin decision. 206 Thus, before the supreme court's decision
in CBA II, it appeared that the substantive changes test would
apply in
207
interpreting the initiative provision in article XIV, section 3.
Instead, the court based its decision in CBA II entirely upon the
strict conjunctive test set forth in Coalition 1,208 failing to address its
previous reliance upon Justice Schaefer's dissent. 2°9 Thus, the court
bypassed all discussion of the substantive changes test 210 under which
21
the term-limits proposal certainly would have been constitutional.
C. QuestionableApplication of the Conjunctive Test
Even if the CBA 11 court was correct in relying upon CoalitionI, the
court's application of the strict conjunctive test is questionable. The
supreme court concluded that the term-limit amendment did not meet
either the structural aspect or the procedural aspect of the requirement
of article XIV, section 3.212 This conclusion is questionable because
205. Lousin, 438 N.E.2d at 1246. The appellate court agreed with Justice Schaefer's
contention in Coalition I that some possible changes to the legislati.ve article would
affect neither the structure nor the procedures of the General Assembly, and would instead
involve changes to legislative powers. Id. Schaefer argued, and the Lousin court agreed,
that the "structural and procedural" requirement of article XIv, § 3, was adopted to
prevent substantive changes to the legislative power. Id. Thus, under Justice Schaefer's
reasoning, a term-limit amendment would pass constitutional muster because, although
it may affect the eligibility of members of the General Assembly, it clearly does not
involve legislative powers.
206. CBA 1, 561 N.E.2d at 55-56. The court failed to address the structural and
procedural effects that the proposed Tax Accountability Amendment would have upon the
legislative article, leaving in question the continuing weight of the prior strict
conjunctive standard. Id.; see supra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
207. See Williams, supra note 9, at 1135.
208. CBA II, 641 N.E.2d at 529.
209. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
210. Justice Harrison's dissent applied Justice Schaefer's substantive changes test,
following the court's interpretation of the initiative provision prior to CBA H. CBA 1!,
641 N.E.2d at 533 (Harrison, J., dissenting). Justice Harrison concluded that because
the term-limit proposal related directly to the composition of the General Assembly, a
"critical area" subject to the initiative process, it should have been allowed on the
ballot. Id. at 533-34 (Harrison, J., dissenting) (citing 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 40, at
2712).
211. See supra note 197. Although term limits may impact "the eligibility of
legislators, the manner and method of their selection, and . . . matters of seniority and
administrative organization," they would not involve changes in "substantive law or
constitutional policy." Schlam, supra note 67, at 67.
212. CBA 11, 641 N.E.2d at 529. The court adhered to the conjunctive interpretation
of the initiative provision set forth in Coalition I, but it maintained that even under a
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the term-limit amendment would affect the composition of the General
Assembly. 2 3 Therefore, the term-limit amendment would satisfy the
conjunctive test by meeting the structural change requirement "and, of
necessity, [incidentally affecting] the procedure of the General
Assembly. 21 4 For instance, the changes in the seniority system
necessitated by the term-limit amendment would affect the structure of
the General Assembly and would require changes in the procedures
used to select members of legislative committees. 2 5 Nevertheless, the
court refused to consider the structural and procedural changes necessitated by the term-limit proposal, instead stating that the "General
Assembly would remain a bicameral legislature consisting of a House
and Senate with a total of 177 members, and would maintain the same
organization.,, 21 6 Thus, the court declared the term-limit proposal

unconstitutional without adequately explaining its refusal to apply the
substantive changes test.
V. IMPACT
After the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in CBA /, a proposed
constitutional amendment must explicitly affect both structural and
procedural subjects contained in the legislative article before an amendment will appear on the general election ballot.2 7 The "structural and
procedural" phrase in article XIV, section 3, however, should not
require the application of a strict conjunctive interpretation.1 8 The
drafters intended to limit the use of the initiative to constitutional rather
than statutory changes, and the use of the phrase "structural and
procedural" attempts to express the drafters' intent to limit the use-of
the provision to amendments of the legislative article not affecting
substantive law. 2 9 The transcripts from the 1970 constitutional convention contain a few specific references to permissible subjects under
the initiative provision, some of which do not pertain to both structure
disjunctive interpretation of the provision, the term-limit amendment was
unconstitutional. Id.; see supra note 161.
213. CBA II, 641 N.E.2d at 533 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
214. Schlam, supra note 67, at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Lousin, 438
N.E.2d at 1251).
215. Id. Writing before the court's decision in CBA II, Professor Schlam predicted
that a term-limit amendment would pass constitutional muster, because "'basic qualities'
of the legislature would be impacted and no substantive matters are involved ... ." Id.
216. CBA 1I, 641 N.E.2d at 529.
217. Id.
218. The substantive changes interpretation is more faithful to the drafters' purpose
than the court's narrow reading of the word "and" in the phrase "structural and
procedural." See supra notes 185-99 and accompanying text.
219. CBA II, 641 N.E.2d at 533 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
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and procedure. 220 For example, reducing the size of the General Assembly, a change the delegates mentioned as permissible under article
XIV, section 3, would alter the composition or structure without
substantially affecting the procedural provisions in the legislative
article. 22' Thus, the drafters of article XIV, section 3 could not have
intended the "structural and procedural" language to require a conjunctive reading, because the delegates' relatively short list of
permissible subjects under the popular initiative provision contained
subjects
that would not pass the Illinois Supreme Court's conjunctive
22 2
test.

The supreme court should have continued in the direction of its prior
decision and applied a substantive changes test in interpreting the
initiative provision at issue in CBA 11.223 Instead, the court read the
provision narrowly, and, consequently, future proposals will have difficulty reaching the ballot.224 Because the court ignored the drafters'
reasons for including the popular initiative provision in the constitution, the supreme court virtually assured that Illinois will never
realize term limits, since it is the type of amendment that the General
Assembly would be reluctant to implement on its own accord. 225 Furthermore, unless a future proposed amendment is an issue specifically
mentioned in the convention debates, the amendment stands virtually
220. The delegates mentioned the following subjects: a reduction in the size of the
General Assembly and the change from multi-member to single-member districts, 4
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 40, at 2710; a change from a bicameral to a unicameral General
Assembly, id. at 2712; and changes in elections, id.; see also Allen, supra note 191, at
132 (explaining that the delegates listed structure and procedure as "alternative
amendable subjects, together with size and other 'basic qualities' of the General
Assembly").
221. Nevertheless, a change in the size of the legislature may in fact affect the
structure of the General Assembly, while at the same time "[incidentally affecting] the
procedure of the General Assembly." Schlam, supra note 67, at 67 (citing Lousin, 438
N.E.2d at 1251). Similarly, a term-limit amendment would pass the conjunctive test
because it would cause changes in "seniority and administrative organization" affecting
the structure of the General Assembly, and incidentally, the procedures as well. Id.
222. See supra note 169. The court in CBA i1 failed to explain how a reduction in the
size of the General Assembly-a change specifically mentioned by the 1970 convention
delegates as permissible under the initiative provision-would pass a conjunctive
reading of the provision. See CBA 11, 641 N.E.2d at 524 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
223. See supra notes 121-25.
224. The court's conjunctive interpretation of article XIV, § 3 would appear to limit
the scope of permissible amendments to those subjects specifically mentioned by the
delegates at the convention. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
225. Schlam, supra note 67, at 67. Professor Schlam noted: "[R]egardless of
whether proposed amendments continue to need to directly impact procedural as well as
structural subjects in Article IV, legislative term limits would seem to be precisely the
kind of proposal suitable for popular initiative under Article XIV." Id.
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no chance of reaching the ballot. 2 6
VI. CONCLUSION
In Chicago Bar Association v. Illinois State Board of Elections, the
Illinois Supreme Court ignored both its earlier decision in CBA I and
the intent of the framers of the Illinois Constitution in strictly construing the popular initiative provision set forth in article XIV, section
3. The court held that the proposed term-limit amendment was unconstitutional because it failed to affect both the structural and procedural
requirements contained in the legislative article. 2 " Thus, Illinois is
virtually assured that a term-limit amendment pertaining to state legislators will never become a reality in the state. 8 In the process, the
popular initiative provision may have been weakened, as future proposals will be hard-pressed to meet the conjunctive structural and
procedural requirement imposed by the Illinois Supreme Court.
STUART K. HOLCOMB III

226. See Allen, supra note 191, at 133. In discussing the court's interpretation of
the popular initiative provision in Coalition 1, Allen noted that the court's conjunctive
reading prevented most proposed amendments from satisfying the "structural and
procedural" requirement in article XIV, § 3. The court's conjunctive reading in CBA i
will likewise severely limit the utility of the initiative provision because the delegates
at the 1970 constitutional convention set forth only a few types of amendments
specifically permissible under the provision. See supra note 220 and accompanying
text.
227. CBA 11, 641 N.E.2d at 529.
228. Id. at 534 (Harrison, J., dissenting).

